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"Have bureaucrats taken over the decision making role of politicians? This book offers a direct assessment of the role of bureaucrats in policy making by analysing how they shape policy in making decrees - laws that generally do not pass through full legislative scrutiny. These are often described as "secondary legislation" and are known by a variety of names (including decrets, arretes, administrative regulations, Verordnungen, statutory instruments). Such decrees offer an important vantage point for understanding bureaucratic power not only because they account for a large proportion of policy making activity within the executive, but also because they are made largely away from the glare of publicity. If bureaucrats have strong policy making powers and use them in a way that minimises political involvement in policy making, we would expect to find these powers especially evident in this "everyday" decision making. The book is based on research examining 52 decrees produced between 2005 and 2008 in six jurisdictions: France, the UK, Germany, Sweden, the United States and the European Union. The comparative perspective allows one to see how far different patterns of bureaucratic involvement in policy making are characteristic of particular political systems and how far they are a general feature of modern bureaucracies. The book asks three main questions about how these decrees are produced: when do politicians become involved in making them? What happens when politicians become involved? And what happens when they are not involved? The answers to these questions are provided by examination of primary source material as well as interviews with over 100 officials."--Publisher's website

This article focuses on the normative problem of establishing how the burdens associated with implementing policies designed to prevent, or manage, climate change should be shared amongst states involved in ongoing international climate change negotiations. This problem has three key features: identifying the nature and extent of the burdens that need to be borne; identifying the type of agent that should be allocated these burdens; and distributing amongst the particular 'tokens' of the relevant 'agent type' climatic burdens according to principles that none could reasonably reject. The article defends a key role in climatic burden-sharing policy for the principle that states benefiting most from activities that cause climate change should bear the greatest burden in terms of the costs of preventing dangerous climate change. I outline two versions of this 'beneficiary pays' principle; examine the strengths and weakness of each version; and explore how the most plausible version (which I call the 'unjust enrichment' principle) could be operationalized in the context of global climate governance.

Der Beitrag beschäftigt sich aus dem Blickwinkel des Werks von Hans-Ulrich Derlien mit Webers Analyse der Verwaltung. Zunächst betrachtet der Beitrag Max Weber im deutschen und britischen Kontext, geht auf Webers Definition von Verwaltung ein und wirft einen Blick auf Max Webers Sicht auf England. Der Fokus richtet sich dabei auf die Frage nach der Bürokratisierung. In seinem Fazit kommt der Autor zu dem Schluss, dass England keine klassisch kontinentale Staatsbürokratie ist, aber seine vorhandenen Elemente der Bürokratie dennoch mittels einer Weberianischen Analyse untersucht werden können. (ICB2)